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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the ﬁnancial aspects
of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulﬁlling debt
crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative
welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent
monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former
monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and
common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this
ability, governments may decide to impose an inﬂation tax on these assets and use
the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that
issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a
monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the
common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under
the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union
central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in
the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not
available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national
monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically
aﬀect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the
other hand, given the ability to inﬂate the local currency, the central bank may be
subject to the political inﬂuence of a government not so strongly concerned with ﬁscal
discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a
common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the inﬂuence of
ag r o u po fc o u n t r i e st oi n ﬂate the common currency, even though they do not face
external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed
as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these
peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare
for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.
Keywords: dollarization, optimum currency area, speculative attacks, debt crisis,
sunspots
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31 Introduction
The traditional criteria for two or more countries to establish an optimum currency
area are based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by Mundell
[18], McKinnon [15] and Kenen [14]. According to these prerequisites, the less is the
n e e dt ov a r yt h ee x c h a n g er a t eb e t w e e nt h el o c a lc u r r e n c ya n dt h a to fi t sp a r t n e ri n
order to adjust for imbalances between the two economies, the greater will be the
advantages of a country’s giving up its own currency and independent monetary pol-
icy. In general, these classic criteria indicate that the candidate countries must have
certain common characteristics, such as :( i )m o b i l ep r o d u c t i v ef a c t o r sa n dﬂexibility
of these markets; (ii) open trade and ﬁnancial interdependence; (iii) symmetry of
shocks and productive cycles; and (iv) diversiﬁed products and portfolios. In the
1990s, after the Treaty of Maastricht, new criteria for macroeconomic convergence
were established for countries wishing to join the European Monetary Union. These
criteria, growing out of the European experience in consolidating the EMU, include
structural reforms and market liberalization along with strengthening the monetary
and ﬁscal positions of the various national economies.
During the second half of the 1990s, most emerging economies were hit hard by
ﬁnancial and foreign exchange crises. The successive crises suﬀered by Mexico in
1994-5, Southeast Asian countries in the second half of 1997, and Russia the following
year spread beyond their local origins to infect the international ﬁnancial market in
general. Some models, such as that of Cole and Kehoe [4] for the Mexican crisis,
theorize that these crises result from a reversal of expectations by foreign investors
worried about the level and maturity of government debt to international bankers.
According to Radelet and Sachs [19], a central element in the Southeast Asian crisis
of 1997 was a high inﬂow of short-term capital, making these countries vulnerable
to a ﬁnancial panic. Once a crisis hits a determined country, it can easily spread
to others that also have weak fundamentals. These models exemplify situations in
which a ﬁxed exchange rate (much used in the 1990s) to attract foreign capital winds
up increasing credit risk based on greater exposure to international liquidity caused
4by excessive foreign debt. This occurred not only in Mexico, Southeast Asia and
Russia, but also in Brazil in 1998-9.
Currently, external savings are still essential to equilibrium in the balance of
payments of some countries. For an economy needing to ﬁnance public spending
and whose main objective is price stability, the recommendation is to exercise ﬁscal
discipline and a rigid monetary policy to increase credibility and therefore lower
the interest rates demanded by foreign lenders. However, some economists argue
that adopting the currency of an anchor country — in short, dollarization — can also
provide this credibility gain (Hanke e Schuler [12]). An intermediate step between
dollarization and sticking to a local currency regime is joining a monetary union in
which a group of countries adopt a common currency and establish a set of rules and
reciprocal beneﬁts. This enables increased credibility without giving up all control
over monetary policy, as long as the union’s central bank is suﬃciently independent.
The elimination of the risk of devaluation and reduction of credit risk are beneﬁts
strongly expected of dollarization. Nevertheless, Chang [3], Goldfajn and Olivares
[11] and Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel [17] warn that dollarization is no guarantee
of reduced credit risk.
We propose to investigate one of the aspects of the debate over dollarization,
monetary union and local currency regime with independent monetary policy as it
applies to countries heavily dependent on foreign capital. Our central focus is to as-
sess the welfare of these economies under each of these arrangements, when there is
a positive probability of a default on the government external debt. As the interna-
tional lenders believe the government is unlikely to honor its debts, they will decide
to suspend new credits which induces the borrowing country to a default. Given a
benevolent government, our purpose is to compare the welfare of the residents of a
country subject to an exogenous shock, that aﬀect the mood of the international
creditors about lending to the country in question. We carry out this exercise for
the three monetary regimes under study, keeping in mind the characteristics of each
one of them, as described below.
5Under dollarization, the national government loses control over the monetary
policy. Due to the high cost of later reverting to a more ﬂexible regime, it can become
powerless to react to external shocks unless there is strong symmetry between the
eﬀect of such shocks on its economy and that of the anchor country. In counterpart,
dollarization provides large credibility gains because monetary policy rests with the
U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, which is strongly committed to low inﬂation. With
monetary union, each member country has some power to inﬂuence the common
monetary policy through its vote in the decision-making system. It provides a lesser
commitment to price stability than dollarization because it allows devaluation of
the common currency to correct for external imbalances. This commitment can
become weaker to the extent that the central bank may be under political pressures
exerted by certain member countries. Finally, under a regime of purely local currency
and independent monetary policy, the government has complete ﬂexibility to make
monetary adjustments, but this freedom can make such regime the least credible
among the three types.
The welfare analysis for the three monetary regimes uses as a reference the self-
fulﬁlling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([4], [5] and [6]). This model can
be viewed as an approximation of a dollarized economy subject to a speculative
attack on its public debt held by international bankers. To represent the monetary
union and local currency regimes, we modify the original model by including public
debt denominated in common currency and local currency respectively, which is
purchased by the national consumers. The issuance of a portion of public debt in
local currency or in common currency is not an option for dollarized economies. But
a national government issuing local currency can decide only to pay a fraction of the
real return on the bonds denominated in local currency to domestic creditors, use
the revenues so raised to pay the debt to international bankers and avoid an external
crisis. Also, a country belonging to a monetary union can ﬁnd an alternative to an
external debt crisis if it obtains extra resources through a decision of the central
authority to abate the real return of the debt denominated in common currency. In
6a similar fashion Sims [22] stands against dollarization and favors surprise inﬂation
as a solution to smooth situations of ﬁscal stress. Sargent [20], commenting on
Sims0 paper, points out the lack of models that discuss the issue of dollarization.
We pretend to bring some contribution to this debate.
In our work, we show that to create an inﬂation tax on debts denominated in
local and in common currencies can be preferable in terms of the welfare of residents
than to suspend payment on dollar-denominated external debt. On the one hand,
a default on dollar debt can contract economic activity and exclude a country from
the international credit market, in turn lowering productivity. On the other hand, a
partial payment of local currency or common currency debts does not carry over to
subsequent periods. It occurs one time only and thus does not reduce productivity,
since domestic creditors know that this partial default is temporary and seeks only
to obtain extra resources quickly to avoid the greater harm of a moratorium on
the external debt. However, the alternative of imposing an inﬂation tax enables
governments to put pressure on central banks, with the goal of resorting to a partial
moratorium in order to increase public spending, even when there is no external
crises to be avoided. Hence, we intend to investigate under which conditions it is
most advantageous for an economy to maintain or not a ﬂexible monetary policy.
For the purpose of simulating the model for the Brazilian economy in recent years
and calculating the levels of welfare mentioned above, we ﬁrst present the changes
in the original model that allow it to incorporate local currency and partial payment
of debts denominated in this currency. We specify in more detail the extension of
the Cole-Kehoe model to a situation of monetary union and include the chance that
the union central bank, under political pressure, will surprise the private sector with
an unexpected monetary policy that particularly serves the interests of a sub-group
of member countries. We further take into account the expectation of the private
sector that asymmetric shocks can aﬀect the national and central government types.
If there are no antagonisms between the optimal choices of the two governments,
then monetary union provides a level of welfare as good as that obtainable in case
7the member country had maintained an independent monetary policy.
On a more methodological ground, this paper could be viewed as a part of
the literature on general equilibrium with bankruptcy, which asserts that on an
incomplete markets situation the introduction of the possibility of bankruptcy can
be welfare enhancing (see Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame [9] for static economies
and Araujo, Pascoa and Torres [2] in inﬁnite horizon economies). The introduction
of local currency could give rise to the possibility of a better bankruptcy technology
through inﬂation than just the repudiation of th ef o r e i g nd e b tw h i c hc a nb eq u i t e
costly. However that may not be the case if the local central bank is too weak to
deal with ﬁscal indiscipline.
2 The Cole-Kehoe Model with Local Currency
Cole and Kehoe developed a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model in which
they consider the possibility of a self-fulﬁlling crisis of public debt held by interna-
tional bankers occurring. Among the results, these authors describe an optimal
government debt policy and show that when the debt is located in the crisis zone,
as e l f - f u l ﬁlling crisis can occur, and that in order to leave this critical region it is
optimal either to run down the debt or draw out its average maturity.
We modify the original Cole-Kehoe model in order to assess the welfare of an
economy with two currencies, one local and the other the dollar. This extension of
the Cole-Kehoe model brings a new perspective to the discussion of dollarization —
the original model being analogous to that of a dollarized economy, and the two-
currency model reproducing an economy that issues local currency and maintains
an independent monetary policy. With this new version, we evaluate the expected
welfare of an economy able to create an inﬂation tax and use the revenue so generated
to avoid an external debt crisis. The local currency is added to this model with the
subterfuge that the government carries public debt in local money and the inﬂation
tax is extracted from consumers when the government decides on the maturity date
to reduce the real return in local-currency debt held by the public.
8Compared with the original version, we include the following variables in the
model with local currency: debt in local currency, D, another sunspot variable, η,
and a variable to represent the government decision whether or not to reduce the real
value of local-currency debt, ϑ. In other aspects, this model closely follows that of
Cole-Kehoe. There are three participants: consumers, international bankers and the
government. Besides there is another public debt instrument: bonds denominated
in dollars, B. We assume that dollar-based debt is only acquired by international
bankers and any suspension in payment is always total, while local-currency debt is
only taken up by consumers and repayment is suspended partially. Uncertainty is
incorporated in the model by the two exogenous sunspot variables, ζ and η. Realiza-
tion of the sunspot variable ζ indicates the bankers’ conﬁdence that the government
will not default on the dollar debt, while η denotes the consumers’ conﬁdence that
t h eg o v e r n m e n tw i l ln o tc r e a t ea ni n ﬂation tax on the local currency debt to avoid
a default on the external debt. Therefore, the realization of η reveals the type of
government, whether more concerned with the stability of prices or output. The
probability that the bankers’s conﬁdence is below the critical value π is equal to
π, which corresponds to the probability of a self-fulﬁlling dollar debt crisis occur-
ring, i.e. P (ζ ≤ π)=π. On the other hand, the probability that the consumers’
conﬁdence is below the critical value ξ is equal to ξ, which is the probability that
government will create an inﬂa t i o nt a xt oa v o i da ne x t e r n a ld e f a u l t( ag o v e r n m e n t
more concerned with avoiding recession), i.e., P (η ≤ ξ | ζ ≤ π)=ξ.
The model with local currency and independent monetary policy also consid-
ers the possibility that the government will declare a partial moratorium on local-
currency debt even though there are no problems in ﬁnancing dollar debt. Inter-
national bankers roll over their loans but still there is a surprise reduction in the
real value of debt in local currency for the purpose of generating extra government
revenues. We suppose that the private sector attributes probability ψξ that the
central bank will act in this manner at a certain instant. When the constant ψ is
equal to 1/ξ, the private sector is certain that the central bank practices a monetary
9policy strongly inﬂuenced by government political interests (denoted as a weak cen-
tral bank). At the other extreme, when the constant ψ is zero, the central bank is
independent (denoted as strong) and resorts to a partial moratorium only to avoid
an external debt crisis.
In the following section we make a second modiﬁcation to the original Cole-
Kehoe model, representing the case of a monetary union. The main characteristics
of a monetary union are the adoption of a common currency, creation of a central
bank for the union and a voting system for, among other purposes, adjusting the
parity of the common currency in relation to the dollar. Our modiﬁcations seek
to assess the welfare of an economy belonging to a monetary union, subject to a
speculative attack on its dollar debt with positive probability and the possibility
that this crisis can be contained by lowering the real return of the debt in the
common currency. In a monetary union, a speculative attack on one member can
be transmitted to the other partners through the channel of coordinated monetary
policy. The monetary union has the option of avoiding a moratorium on external
debt by countries in crisis and resorting to inﬂating the common money, depending
on the relative weight each country carries in the union’s voting system.
3A M o n e t a r y U n i o n M o d e l
The monetary union model is still one with two currencies, the common (rather
than local) one and the dollar. Each country can issue debt in these two currencies,
but the recourse to partial payment of debt in common currency is under greater
control than if it could issue its own money, insofar as a partial default depends on
the approval of the majority of member countries.
This version incorporates I economies and a central government, equivalent to
the Council of the European Union, constituted as the decision-making body for all
members. Each country i, i =1 , ...,I, issues bonds denominated in the common
currency, Di, and the central government decides whether or not to reduce this
debt through the variable ϑ
u, with the result subject to the votes of the national
10governments.
This model is similar to the extension of the Cole-Kehoe model to a country with
its own local currency and independent monetary policy. We suppose that there is
only one good, produced with physical capital and inelastic labor supply. The price
of this reference good is normalized at one dollar, or pt units of the common currency,
in all member countries. International bankers hold dollar-denominated bonds of
each country i of the union, Bi, i =1 ,...,I , and in case a determined government
is unable to honor this debt, payment is always totally suspended (i.e., a country
does not undertake a partial default of dollar debt). Furthermore, consumers only
acquire bonds denominated in the common currency issued by the government of
their own country i, Di, and in this case a moratorium can be partial.
Additionally, for each country i, there are two sunspot variables, ζ
i and ηi.T h e
expected value of ζ
i constitutes the expectation of international bankers regarding
the decision of the government of country i to honor its dollar debt. This expecta-
tion is reﬂected in the bond prices foreign lenders are willing to pay. If the dollar
debt level of country i is below the crisis zone, then the realization of the variable ζ
i
is not relevant, because creditors are not worried about its result in order to make
loans to this country. However, if the dollar debt level is in the crisis zone, then an
unfavorable realization of this variable indicates a speculative attack on this debt. In
this case, the external creditors do not roll over their loans because they believe that
the government will fail to honor its obligations. With suspension of foreign credits,
the government chooses to suspend payments and suﬀer the consequences, namely:
falling output and lack of new dollar loans in the future. Given the positive proba-
bility of this state occurring next period, then the international bankers pay less for
the government dollar debt, than they would otherwise. On the other hand, real-
ization of the ηi variable reﬂects at all moments whether each national government
is more worried about stability of prices or national output. This sunspot variable
performs a relevant function when the national governments conjecture on inﬂating
the common money to avoid an external crisis in their economies. Nevertheless, if
11no member country is under speculative attack on its dollar debt, then the realiza-
tion of this variable for the member countries as a group becomes irrelevant, since
there is no reason to inﬂate. The diﬀerence between realization of ηi for each coun-
try corresponds to the political risk the corresponding national government faces in
adopting a common currency. Antagonistic types of national governments can result
in diﬀerent preferences regarding the conduct of a common monetary policy. This
same question is analyzed by Alesina and Grilli [1], but using a diﬀerent theoretical
approach.
T h er e l a t i v ei n ﬂuence (or weighting) of each country in the union’s voting sys-
tem, λ
i, and the realization of the ηi variables will characterize the type of central
government, whether more concerned with stability of output or prices. The results
of the weights λ
i and the realizations of ηi for all the countries is synthesized in the
random variable ηu. The realization of the sunspot variables ηi and ηu indicates
whether the government of country i and the central government are in harmony
regarding price versus output stability. When ηi and ηu reveal that both govern-
ments are of the same type, then one can say that there is symmetry between the
shocks faced by the government of country i and the union’s central government.
Otherwise there is asymmetry.
3.1 Description of the market participants
(i) Consumers of Country i 1
Each country has an inﬁnite number of consumers who live forever and have















with  i being the weighting of the utility of private consumption, ci,i nr e l a t i o nt o
the utility of public consumption , v(gi). The consumer budgetary constraint at time
1All the parameters, variables and functions that are not deﬁned in this subsection can be found


































At all points in time, the consumers of country i designate a part of their savings
to buy government bonds in common currency, di
t+1,a tap r i c eo fqi
t units of the good
per bond and receive ϑ
u
t units of the good per bond for the total bonds acquired in
the previous period, di
t. The common-currency debt consists of zero-coupon bonds
maturing in one period, that pay one unit of the good at the price in common
currency eﬀective in the preceding period. The price of one bond at time t is e qi
t in
units of common currency. With pt as the price of one unit of the good in common





units of the good for each bond at
this time. In the following period, if the government does not undertake a partial
default, then the creditor receives a full unit of the good, the same as with a dollar-
denominated bond. In this case, ϑ
u
t equals 1. However, if the government decides





u < 1 units of the good, instead of a full unit. In the model
with local currency, payment for bonds in local currency is denoted by ϑ
i
tDi
t,w h i c h
includes the decision variable for the national government, ϑ
i




We also assume that at the start, each consumer holds di
0 units of the common-
currency debt of country i and ki
0 units of the good.
(ii) International Bankers























13which includes purchase and redemption of dollar debt of the I countries of the
monetary union. Each banker pays q∗i
t per dollar-denominated bond of country i at
time t, bi
t+1. We suppose that each bond matures in one period and pays out one
unit of the good at t+1if there is no suspension of debt payments. Besides this, we
assume that at the initial moment, external creditors hold bi
0 bonds of the dollar debt
of each country i and that the supply of credits from international bankers meets
the demand for loans from these countries without competition causing a liquidity
crisis.2
(iii) National Government
It is considered to be benevolent in that it seeks to maximize the welfare of
its domestic consumers. The lack of a commitment to pay oﬀ its debt and to
deﬁne a path for borrowing and spending allows multiple equilibria. At time t,
the government of country i makes the following choices: a) dollar new borrowing
level, Bi
t+1; b) common-currency new borrowing level , Di
t+1; c) whether or not to
partially default on its old common-currency debt, ϑ
u
t; d) whether or not to default
on its old dollar debt, zi
t; and e) current government consumption, gi
t. The budgetary








































































There is no seigniorage in the above expression. The national government raises
additional revenue by lowering the real value of its common-currency debt held by
consumers and not through expanding the money supply. This revenue is denoted
by (1 − ϑ
u
t)Di
t,w h e r eϑ
u
t c a nt a k eo nt w ov a l u e s : 1o rφ
u =
1
1+χu,w i t hχu
2Fratszcher [10], Hernández and Valdés [13] and Van Rijckeghem and Weder [23] justify the
presence of a common lender as one of the causes for the crises in emerging market countries
during the 1990s. However, we do not include this possibility in the present model.
14being the inﬂation rate. Abatement of common-currency debt means fewer goods
in the economy if the national government uses this recourse to settle its dollar
debts and hence to avoid a default. The lesser the number of goods that can be
acquired in country i implies an increase in the internal price of the goods. Therefore,
the reduction in the real return of common-currency debt Di
t is a means of taxing
it, similar to an inﬂation tax. Based on this, we alternatively use the expressions
lowering (or reducing, abating) common currency debt and inﬂating the common
currency, although we do not explicitly describe the monetary market.
With dollarization, country i only has debts in dollars. In this case, the govern-
ment of country i cannot independently choose ϑ
i
t or vote for choice ϑ
u
t.I nar e g i m e
of local currency, country i issues debt in its own currency and so Di
t is not zero as
it is for dollarization.
(iv) Central Union Government
This entity, also assumed benevolent, has a diﬀerent role than a national govern-
ment. It has two main functions: (i) to decide on the reduction factor for debt in
common currency, ϑ
u
t, weighted by the respective decisions of the member countries
according to their relative inﬂuence in the voting system, λ
i, i =1 ,...,I; and (ii)
to collect the revenues of all countries of the monetary union obtained by inﬂating
the common currency and thereafter to distribute this money through transfers to





























j the weight attributed to a country j which is worried about price stability.
If the sum of the weights of the countries that do not wish to inﬂate the common
currency is greater than two-thirds of the total votes, then the central government
chooses ϑ
u =1 .
15Whenever the central government decides to inﬂate the common currency, if no
member country can disproportionately pressure the union’s central bank for extra
resources, then each national government receives transfers equal to the abatement
of debt in common currency extracted from consumers of that country. Otherwise,
the central government can give in to pressures from a certain country and earmark
a relatively greater share of this inﬂation tax to that country, reducing the share
transferred to the other members. We denote by  i the fraction of the transfers from
the central to national government of country i relative to the total revenue raised
in this country through lowering common-currency debt. Hence, a country with low
bargaining power with the central government is deﬁned as having 0 ≤  i < 1.I ft h i s
country has relatively greater inﬂuence over the central government, the situation is
 i > 1, and if the central government of the union is not subject to undue pressures
from any country, then  i =1 .3 Thus, when  i 6=1 , the budgetary constraint for
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We also assume that at the initial period for each country i the supply of dollar
debt Bi
0 is equal to its demand for this debt, bi
0; the supply of common-currency
debt Di
0 is equal to the demand for this type of debt, di
0; and the aggregate capital
stock per worker, Ki
0, is equal to the individual capital stock, ki
0.W ea l s om a i n t a i n
the hypothesis of Cole-Kehoe that if the government of country i fails to pay its
dollar debt in the current period, then output will fall to αi,w i t h0 <α i < 1,
and remain at this level thereafter. Similarly, we suppose that if the central union
government decides to pay only 0 <φ
u < 1 units of the good per bond instead of
a full unit, then output does not fall, consumers receive φ
u units of the good per
common-currency bond, and believe that the government will only henceforth start
3Cooper and Kempf [8] study two regional power conﬁgurations. In the ﬁrst, two groups are
able to pressure the central monetary authority to inﬂate the common currency, and in the second,
only one of the regions beneﬁts from seigniorage. Their work inspired the inclusion of countries
with diﬀerent bargaining power levels over the central bank in this extension of the Cole-Kehoe
model.
16paying this quantity of goods per bond.4
3.2 An equilibrium
Following the Cole-Kehoe model, we deﬁne a recursive equilibrium for country i
belonging to a monetary union, with a strong central bank (independent of political
pressures). Suppose the weighting λ
i of each nation in the voting system of the
union is known to all and invariable.
3.2.1 Timing




t are realized and the aggregate state of
















t+1) as given, chooses the level of new dollar debt to oﬀer, Bi
t+1;





t+1) as given, chooses the level of new common-
currency debt to oﬀer, Di
t+1, and each country knows the supply and demand
of common-currency bonds for other member countries;
• International bankers, taking as given q∗i
t for each country i and ϑ
u
t,c h o o s e
the level of dollar bonds to acquire, bi
t+1, i =1 , ..., I;




t as given, choose the level of common-
currency bonds issued by their country that they want to buy, di
t+1;




• The national governments decide whether or not to default on their dollar
debts, zi
t, and choose their current consumption, gi
t ;
4This latter hypothesis means that at the time the government creates an inﬂation tax, the
return on a common-currency bond is less than in prior periods. As will be seen below, the return
is φ
u/β and not 1/β or (1 − ξ
u + φ
uξ
u)/β as previously. At later times, the price which consumers
pay for this bond is φ
uβ and it pays back φ
u units of the good.
17• Consumers, taking ai
t = ai(ai
t−1, zi
t)a sg i v e n ,c h o o s eci
t and ki
t+1.
3.2.2 States and value functions of agents from country i
Consumers make decisions at two points in time: ﬁrst, they choose the level of
common-currency bonds, d0i, and then they decide on ci and k0i. We assume that
in choosing d0i, consumers know their state variables ki, di, si, B0i and D0i.A l s o ,
they know the aggregate state, si, B0i and λ
i for all countries. Upon deciding d0i,
the consumers’ state is (ki, di, si, B01, ..., B0I, D0i). Given si and λ
i,f o ri =1 , ...,
I, the private sector knows the type of central government and thus whether or not
inﬂation is a recourse that will be used to avoid an external debt crisis for the union
in the current period. If more than two-thirds of the countries have dollar debts in
the crisis zone, then depending on the realization of ηu, the central government may
decide to inﬂate the common currency. Once inﬂated, this alternative is no longer
available and from then on the realization of ηu is no longer relevant. Given si and
B01, ..., B0I, consumers of country i know q∗i(si, B0i) and assess the willingness of
international bankers to roll over their loans, zi. Additionally, they anticipate the
decisions of national governments regarding gi and of the central government about
ϑ
u. Therefore, at the time of choosing d0i, they have rational expectations concerning
q∗i, qi, gi, zi, ϑ
u and ai(si, zi) and know the decisions they will henceforth make
about ci and k0i.
In deciding about ci and k0i, consumers already know the price of a common-
currency bond, qi, and also the price paid by international bankers for dollar bonds,
q∗i. In addition, they have already discovered zi, ϑ
u and gi. Hence, in choosing ci
and k0i, the state of a representative consumer of country i is (ki, di, si, B01, ...,
B0I, D0i, q∗1, ..., q∗I, gi, zi, ϑ







































































































































































































with ∆ a positive constant.
In turn, in choosing b0i, international bankers know bi, si, B0i and D0i for all the
countries of the monetary union. Besides this, they take as given qi, q∗i and ϑ
u ,
since these depend on si, B0i and D0i,w h i c ha r ek n o w nf o ra l li. Hence, the state
of a representative banker corresponds to (b1, ..., bI, s1, ..., sI, B01, ..., B0I, D01,




































































































with Λ a positive constant.
T h eg o v e r n m e n to fc o u n t r yi also makes decisions at two moments in time. At
ﬁrst, when choosing B0i and D0i,t h eg o v e r n m e n tk n o w ssi, q∗i(si, B0i)a n dqi(si,
B01,...,B0I) for itself and all other member countries. Thereupon, it chooses gi and
zi. In the Cole-Kehoe model with local currency, the decisions of country i for gi, zi
and ϑ
i depend only on si and its own choices regarding B0i and D0i. In our monetary
union model, the choice of gi and zi also depends on ϑ
u.
In accordance with the timing, the government of country i knows the decision
of the central government for ϑ
u on choosing gi(si, B0i, q∗i(si,B0i), D0i, qi(si,B01,...,
B0I), ϑ
u)a n dzi(si, B0i, q∗i(si, B0i), D0i, qi(si,B01,...,B0I), ϑ
u), and recognizes that
through its actions it can aﬀect the prices that external creditors are willing to pay
f o ri t sd o l l a rd e b t ,q∗i(si, B0i) and production parameter ai(si, zi). In addition, it
perceives that the choices of national governments regarding B0i for all i aﬀect ϑ
u,
qi(si, B01, ..., B0I) and the optimal decisions of consumers ci(ki, di, si, B01, ..., B0I,
D0i, q∗1,...,q∗I, gi, zi, ϑ
u), k0i(ki, di, si, B01, ..., B0I, D0i, q∗1,...,q∗I, gi, zi, ϑ
u)a n d
d0(ki, di, si, B01,..., B0I, D0i). Thus, when the national government chooses B0i and
D0i, it takes as given q∗i, qi, gi, zi, ϑ















































































































20After national and international creditors have decided about rolling over their
loans, the government of country i decides whether to pay its dollar debt, comparing
the relative levels of welfare for zi ∈ {0, 1},g i v e nϑ
u ∈ {φ
u, 1}. The choice of zi
determines the level of productivity, ai(si, zi), and of current government spending,
gi, which must be positive. The policy functions zi(si, B0i, q∗i, D0i, qi, ϑ
u)a n dgi(si,
B0i, q∗i, D0i, qi, ϑ
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u =1or
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When the central government chooses ϑ
u,i tk n o w ssi, B0i(si) and D0i(si),f o r
each country i, and also knows how its action will aﬀect the decisions of national
governments regarding zi and gi, and of consumers regarding ci and k0i.T h u s ,
having information about si for each country i, the central government is able to
assess the preference of each one concerning ϑ
u, ϑ
u =1or φ
u.I f m o r e t h a n t w o -
thirds of the total votes are from countries that prefer an inﬂation tax, then the
central government chooses ϑ
u equal to φ
u.
T h ec h o i c eo fϑ
u may be the result of the following procedure. Given the initial
state si, B0i and D0i for all i, the central government envisions what would be
the choice of each member country for the debt abatement factor ϑ
i in case each
country had its own currency and independent monetary policy. Considering these
21individual choices, the central government estimates the expected welfare of each
country i and the weighted sum of these levels, W, using the weights attributed
in the voting system. The central government chooses ϑ
u by equating W to the
weighted sum of the welfare of all members of the union, when it supposes that ϑ
u
is chosen by all of them instead of ϑ










where Vgu is the value function of the central government.
3.2.3 Deﬁnition of an equilibrium
An equilibrium corresponds to a list of value functions Vci for the representative
consumer of country i, Vb for the representative international banker, Vgi for the
national government of country i and Vgu for the central government; policy functions
ci, k0i and d0i for the consumer of country i, x, b01,...,b 0I for the international banker,
B0i, D0i, gi and zi for the national government of country i and ϑ
u for the central
government; price functions for the public debt in dollars of country i, q∗i,a n df o r
the debt in common currency of country i, qi, and an equation of motion for the
aggregate capital stock, K0i,f o ra l li =1 ,...,I, such that:
(i) given B01, ..., B0I, D0i, q∗i, gi, zi and ϑ
u, Vci is the value function to solve the
problem of the representative consumer of country i,p r o b l e m(2),a n dci, k0i
and d0i are the optimal choices of this consumer;
(ii) given B01, ..., B0I, D01, ..., D0I, q∗1, ..., q∗I, q1, ..., qI, z1, ..., zI and ϑ
u, Vb
is the value function to solve the problem of the representative international
banker, problem(3),a n dx and b01, ..., b0I are the optimal choices;
(iii) given q∗i, qi, gi, zi, ϑ
u, ci and K0i , Vgi is the value function to solve the
problem of the national government of country i ,p r o b l e m(4),a n dB0i and
D0i are its optimal choices. Furthermore, given ci, K0i, Vgi, B0i, D0i and ϑ
u,
the functions gi and zi are the solutions that maximize problem (5);
22(iv) given B0i, D0i and ϑ
i for all i, along with the weights λi, the central government
chooses ϑ
u;
(v) B0i(si) ∈ b0i(Bi,s i,B0i,D 0i);
(vi) D0i(si) = d0i(Di,s i,B01,...,B0I,D 0i);
(vii) K0i(si, B01, ..., B0I, D0i, q∗1, ..., q∗I, gi, zi, ϑ
u) = k0i(Ki, Di, si, B01, ..., B0I,
D0i, q∗1, ..., q∗I, gi, zi, ϑ
u).
3.3 Characterization of the equilibrium
Depending on the realization of the sunspot variables ζ
i, ηi and ηu, dollar debt crises
for country i can occur with positive probability. In constructing an equilibrium, we
assume an uniform distribution in the interval [0,1] for ζ
i, ηi and ηu. Nevertheless,
these three variables are not independent.5 We suppose this property applies only
to ζ
i and ηu and ζ
i and ηi. In this fashion, the probability that external lenders
lose conﬁdence in the government of country i and that the central government is
willing to resort to inﬂation to avoid a drop in output corresponds to the product
P(ζ
i ≤ πi) · P(ηu ≤ ξ
u), which is equal to πiξ
u.
The crisis zone of probability πi(1 − ξ
u)f o rt h ed o l l a rd e b to fc o u n t r yi is
denoted by the interval (bi(kni, Di), Bi(kπiξu
, Di, πi, ξ
u)].6 Now suppose that a
group of member countries, the sum of whose votes is equal to at least two-thirds of
the total, have dollar debts in their respective crisis zones. Then, there is a positive
probability ξ
u that the central government will partial default the common-currency
debt. For any country i, given the initial state si = (kπiξu








−1 =1 , there are eight possible outcomes, depending on the
realization of the sunspot variables. These possible situations can be described by a
tree diagram that indicates a partition of the sample space Ω,w h e r eΩ ={ ( ζ
i, ηi,
ηu): 0 ≤ ζ
i ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ηu ≤ 1}. We assume πi, ξ
i and ξ
u are real numbers
5In the model with local currency, we suppose that ζ and η are independent and identically
distributed with an uniform distribution function in the interval [0,1].
6The capital stocks kni and kπiξu
are chosen when there is a probability of a dollar-debt crisis
of, respectively, zero and πi (1 − ξ
u) in the following period.
23in the interval [0, 1] and use the notation H for each of the intervals 0 ≤ ζ
i ≤ πi, 0
≤ ηi ≤ ξ
i and 0 ≤ ηu ≤ ξ
u and T,f o rt h ei n t e r v a l sπi <ζ
i ≤ 1, ξ
i <η i ≤ 1 and
ξ
u <η u ≤ 1.H e n c e ,e v e n tB, denoted by (H, H, H), corresponds to the subset of
Ω given by {(ζ
i, ηi, ηu): 0 <ζ
i ≤ πi, 0 <η i ≤ ξ
i, 0 <η u ≤ ξ
u)}; event C, denoted
by (H, T, H) corresponds to {(ζ
i, ηi, ηu): 0 ≤ ζ
i ≤ πi, ξ
i <η i < 1, 0 ≤ ηu ≤ ξ
u)};
a n ds oo nt h r o u g he v e n tI (Figure 1).
Figure 1 is a tree diagram for any country i and initial aggregate state si (rep-
resented by point A), known at the beginning of period t. The branches of the
tree indicate the probabilities that the market participants face before realization
of the sunspot variables at time t. The probability of event B is speciﬁed by dsi.
If this outcome occurs, the national government of country i does not default on
the dollar debt and the central monetary authority declares a partial moratorium
on the common—currency debt because the central government is revealed to be in
favor of stabilizing output, being of the same type as the national government. The
probability of outcome C is given by dai. Outcome C is similar to B,e x c e p tt h a t
the shocks that reveal the central and national government types are asymmetric.
T h es h o c k sa r es y m m e t r i cf o re v e n t sB, E, F and I. The remaining outcomes of
Figure 1 correspond to asymmetric shocks.
All the events of Figure 1 are mutually exclusive, and given the assumption of
independence between the sunspot variables ζ
i and ηu, the summed probabilities of
outcomes B and C correspond to the probability πiξ
u; the sum of the probabilities
of outcomes D and E to πi(1 − ξ
u); that of events F and G to (1 − πi)ξ
u;a n d
ﬁnally, the sum of the probabilities of the ﬁnal two events equals (1 − πi)(1 − ξ
u).
With perfect correlation between the shocks on the types of central and national
governments, then the central government is willing to inﬂate the money anytime
the national government is also willing to do so. This is the case of perfect symmetry
between the shocks analyzed in this article.
By assumption, once the central government has inﬂated the common currency,
this recourse is thereafter no longer available. In this fashion, if the events B, C,
24F or G occur and the dollar debt is in the crisis zone, then there is a probability
πi that a dollar debt crisis will occur in the following period. The crisis zone in this
case is denoted by (b(kni, Di), B(kπi, Di, πi, φ
u)]. The upper bound of this interval
indicates that there was a partial moratorium on common-currency debt, given by
the term φ
u.
In the next step to construct an equilibrium, we describe the optimal behavior
of the market participants, supposing that: (i) at least two-thirds of the votes are
from member countries with dollar debts in their respective crisis zones; and (ii)
there has not been any external debt crisis in any of the countries of the monetary
union, nor partial moratoria of common-currency debt, up to the initial state (i.e.,
ai
−1 =1for all i and ϑ
u
−1 =1 ).
Consumers and International Bankers
The behavior of consumers of country i and of international bankers depends
on their expectations regarding whether the national government will default on
the dollar debt and the central government will inﬂate the common currency in the
following period.
Consumers of Country i




t when making their decisions as
to ci
t and ki
t+1. Additionally, we suppose that they take these variables as given
in deciding on di




t depends only on the consumer’s
decision about di
t+1, which is done at period t and with the choice of qi
t. In the next
period, given Bt+2, Dt+2 and q∗
t+1, there are four possible choices for ki
t+2 and three
for qi
t+1, according to the realization of the sunspot variables ζ
i and ηu and also on
the levels of Bi
t+2,f o ri =1 , ..., I. Hence, ﬁxing kt+2 and qi
t+1, the optimization





















































































The ﬁrst-order condition for optimal individual capital accumulation, ki
t+1,i st h e
same as in the original Cole-Kehoe model. The expression for the Cobb-Douglas
























The optimal capital, ki
t+1, depends on consumers’ expectations regarding the pro-
ductivity of the economy in the following period. The ﬁrst-order condition with
relation to di









The possible values for capital accumulation are: kπiξu
, kπi, kdi and kni.I f
consumers expect a dollar debt crisis to occur with probability πi(1 − ξ
u), they
a r ea tp o i n tA of the tree diagram in Figure 1. They choose capital kπiξu
,w h i c h
is obtained by substituting the expression Et [at+1] = 1 − πi(1 − αi)(1 − ξ
u)i n




per common-currency bond. Even with an expectation of symmetric or asymmetric
shocks, consumers choose ki
t+1 equal to kπiξu
and qi




private sector believes the probability is ξ
u that the central government will inﬂate
the common money in the following period, regardless of whether the shocks on the
types of governments are correlated or not. Consumers choose ki
t+1 equal to kπi if the
government undertakes a partial default on the common-currency and if they believe
that the national government will suspend payment on dollar debts with probability
πi in the following period. In this case, they are in one of the states B, C, F or G of
t h et r e ed i a g r a m .T h e yc h o o s eki
t+1 = kπi,g i v e nb yEt [at+1] = 1 − πi(1 − αi)a n d
26pay βφ
u for common-currency bonds no matter what the new dollar debt is. From
each of the outcomes B, C, F or G, there are two new branches, representing two
possible events: to default or not on dollar debt. Now symmetry of shocks between
the national and central governments is no longer important, because there is no
longer any chance for the central government to abate the common-currency debt.
The third capital stock kdi,g i v e nb yEt [at+1] = αi, is chosen if the government
defaults on dollar debt. Besides this, the consumers pay βφ
u per common-currency
bond if there was a partial moratorium previously. Otherwise (represented by events
D or E), they pay β(1 − ξ
u + φ
uξ
u). In the period following outcomes D or E,f o u r
other events are possible, depending on the realization of the sunspot variables ηi
and ηu:i n ﬂation of the common money and symmetry of shocks, with probability
si;i n ﬂation of the common currency and asymmetry of shocks, with probability ai;
no inﬂation and symmetry, sc;a n dn oi n ﬂation and asymmetry, ac.T h e s u m o f
the probabilities si and ai corresponds to ξ
u,a n do fsc and ac to (1 − ξ
u).
Finally, if consumers are certain that the government will not default on dol-
lar debt in the next period, then they choose ki
t+1 equal to kni, corresponding to
Et [at+1]=1 , and pay either βφ
u or β(1 − ξ
u + φξ
u), depending on whether or not,
respectively, the central government has resorted to inﬂating the common currency.
International Bankers


































If international bankers believe that a dollar debt crisis will occur with probability
πi (1 − ξ
u) in the following period, they pay β(1 − πi + πiξ
u) for dollar bonds issued
27by country i. If the central government has undertaken a partial default in common-
currency debt in the current period and external creditors believe that the national
government will default the dollar debt with probability πi in the following period,
they pay β (1 − πi) for dollar debt. However, if the government currently defaults
on the dollar debt, then international bankers only acquire the bonds of country i if
the price is zero. Finally, if external creditors are sure that the government will not
resort to a dollar debt moratorium in the following period, they choose q∗i
t equal to
β.
3.4 The crisis zone
Before describing the behavior of national governments, we deﬁn et h ec r i s i sz o n eo f
country i when the common-currency debt is ﬁxed at Di and the inﬂation the central
government can impose is given by the abatement factor for common-currency debt,
φ
u.
Crisis zone of probability πi (1 − ξ
u)
The lower bound bi (kni,D i,ξ
u) of the crisis zone of probability πi (1 − ξ
u) is the
highest dollar debt level, Bi,g i v e nkni, Di and ξ
u, for which the following restriction


















i, ηi, ηu)i sa ni n i t i a ls t a t ei nw h i c ht h en a t i o n a l
government did not resort to a moratorium on dollar debt (ai
−1 =1 ), the central
government did not undertake a partial moratorium on common-currency debt (ϑ
u
−1
=1 ), and only the realization of the sunspot variable ηu matters. The welfare
levels V niξu
(si,0,0,D i,qi) and V di (si,0,0,D i,qi) refer to the government decision,
respectively, not to default and to default on the dollar debt, even if it does not
sell new dollar bonds at a positive price at the current period. The second and
third positions of the argument of the welfare functions mean that B0i and q∗i are




28long as there is an expectation of inﬂating the common currency in the next period.
Otherwise, it is sold for β.
The upper bound of the crisis zone, Bi(kπiξu
, Di, πi, ξ
u), is the highest level of
dollar debt for which international bankers extend loans to country i,g i v e np r o b -
ability πi (1 − ξ
u) of a dollar debt crisis occurring in the following period. It is
calculated as the highest level of dollar debt such that the following restrictions are




































where the initial aggregate state of the condition (8)i sn o wd e ﬁned by si = (kπiξu
,
Bi, Di, 1, 1, ζ
i, ηi, ηu), with ai
−1 =1 , ϑ
u
−1 =1 , ζ
i >π i,a n yηi and ηu >ξ
u.7 The
welfare levels V πiξu
(si, B0i, q∗i, Di, qi)a n dV di(si, B0i, q∗i, Di, qi) correspond to
the decision of the national government, respectively, not to declare (zi =1 )a n d
to declare (zi =0 ) a moratorium on dollar debt, and of the central government
not to inﬂate the common currency (ϑ
u =1 ). This condition guarantees that for
a given initial aggregate state si = (kπiξu
, Bi, Di, 1, 1, ζ
i, ηi, ηu), with ζ
i >π i,
any ηi and ηu >ξ
u, the government of country i repays its dollar debt as long as
it manages to sell new dollar debt at price q∗i and new common-currency debt at
price qi, accumulating a capital stock of K0i.
Analogously, restriction (9) determines that the government of country i prefers
to honor its dollar obligations rather than resort to a moratorium, given the state
si = (kπiξu
, Bi, Di, 1, 1, ζ
i, ηi, ηu), with ζ
i ≤ πi and ηu ≤ ξ
u,a sl o n ga si ti sa b l et o
sell new dollar debt at q∗i and new common-currency debt at βφ
u.T h ew e l f a r el e v e l s
V πi(si, B0i, q∗i, Di, βφ
u)a n dV di(si, B0i, q∗i, Di, βφ
u) result, respectively, from a
decision of the national government not to default and to default on dollar debt as
7The realization of the sunspot variable ηi may take any value, because we are not making
assumptions about the correlation between ηi and ηu. This correlation is irrelevant to national
governments and international bankers, when they are taking decisions about the level of dollar
debt.




There is a third condition that must be satisﬁed to obtain the upper bound of
the crisis zone. It is identical to condition (9), except that the realization of the
sunspot variables are ζ
i >π i and ηu ≤ ξ
u. Given these outcomes, the expectation of
national and international creditors is that the national government will not default
o nt h ed o l l a rd e b ta n dt h ec e n t r a lg o v e r n m e n tw i l li n ﬂate the common currency (zi
=1and ϑ
u = φ
u). Based on this belief, they buy dollar debt for β(1 − πi)a n d
common-currency debt for βφ
u. The optimal new dollar debt also has to satisfy the
condition that the welfare of not defaulting is greater than defaulting. This is the
cost for country i to join a monetary union. Unfavorable realizations of the sunspot
variables ζ
i for the majority of countries can lead the central government to resort to
a partial moratorium of common-currency debt even if the external sector of country
i is not in any diﬃculty.
Crisis zone of probability πi after inﬂation
It is possible to deﬁne a crisis zone of probability πi,d e n o t e db y( bi(kni, Di, φ
u),
Bi(kπi, Di, πi, φ
u)]. The lower bound is similar to that calculated by condition (7),
assuming there was abatement of common-currency debt. Calculation of the upper
bound considers, besides this assumption, that the national government prefers not
t od e f a u l to nd o l l a rd e b t ,g i v e nt h a ti ts e l l sB0i at positive price q∗i and Di at price
βφ
u.W et h u so b t a i nBi(kπi, Di, πi, φ
u) as the highest level of Bi, given the initial
aggregate state si = (kπi, Bi, Di, 1, φ
u, ζ
i, ·, ·), with ai























where V πi(si, B0i, q∗i, Di, βφ
u)a n dV d(si, B0i, q∗i,Di, βφ
u) refer to the welfare
levels of national government i when it decides, respectively, not to default and to
default on dollar debt.
30A dollar-debt crisis can also occur with probability πi in country i,g i v e nt h e
initial state si = (kπi, Bi, Di, 1, 1, ζ
i, ηi, ηu), as long as creditors are sure the
central government will not inﬂate the common currency in the following period.
In this case, P(ηu ≤ ξ
u) =0a n di tt u r n so u tt h a tξ
u is zero. The probability that
the central government will inﬂate the common currency is zero when more than
t w o - t h i r d so ft h ev o t e sc o m ef r o mc o u n t r i e st h a th a v en od o l l a rd e b t si nt h ec r i s i s
zone. In this case, the crisis zone of probability πi corresponds to the interval (bi(kni,
Di), Bi(kπi, Di, πi)] and the procedure to obtain its extreme values is the same as
above.
3.5 Optimal decisions of national government i
Following the same procedure as Cole and Kehoe [6], we obtain the optimal behavior
of the national government when its dollar debt, Bi
t, is in the no-crisis zone and in
the crisis zone. We suppose that Di is ﬁxed and φ
u is known.
Dollar debt in the no-crisis zone
To characterize the optimal government policy in the no-crisis zone, we solve the




t+1, in order to be sure not to have a dollar-debt
crisis in the following period, given Bi
t ≤ bi(kni, Di, ξ
u), Ki






























































The expectation refers to the possibility of a partial default on common-currency
debt in the following period. In a monetary union, although dollar debt of Bi
t ≤
31bi(kni, Di, ξ
u) does not cause external creditors to lose conﬁdence regarding its
repayment, there is a probability of ξ
u that the central government will inﬂate the
common currency if this alternative has not already been used.
If ξ
u =0in all periods, the solution is equal to that of the model with local
currency. In this case, for dollar debt in the crisis zone, q∗i = β, qi = β, z =1 , K0i =
kni and ϑ
u =1 , in every period. Also, the ﬁrst-order condition for the government’s
problem regarding Bi
t+1 results in v0(gi
t) = v0(gi
t+1) and the optimal behavior of
national government i consists of holding its current consumption steady, gi
t = gi
t+1.
Hence, if at the start the dollar debt is Bi
0 ≤ bi(kni, Di, ξ
u), then the optimal new
dollar debt is to maintain the same level Bi
0.
On the other hand, if ξ



































































t+1 are the national government consumption levels, when the central
government decides, respectively, not to partial default (ϑ
u




u), the common-currency debt. Now the previous optimal decision
to hold government consumption constant in all periods may no longer be the best
decision.
Dollar debt in the crisis zone
If the dollar debt is in the crisis zone, the decision regarding Bi
t+1 is that which
provides the highest welfare from the perspective of the national government among
the following options: resorting to a moratorium; lowering the debt to b(kni, Di,
ξ
u)i nT periods if no crisis occurs; or never lowering it. To characterize this optimal
policy, suppose that (8)a n d( 9) are not active and that there is no default, neither
on the dollar debt, nor on the common-currency debt currently (zt =1and ϑt =
321). Moreover, assume that there is probability πi(1 − ξ
u) of a default on the dollar
debt in the following period and in all other periods in which there was no default

































































































t+1 are the government consumption levels, when the central gov-
ernment decides, respectively, not to partial default and to partial default on the
common-currency debt, given that the national government i did not default on the
dollar debt.
This condition does not result in constant government consumption. The an-
alytic expression for the expected welfare is more complex than that obtained in
the original Cole-Kehoe model, since we are considering the possibility of a partial
default on the common-currency debt. These same conclusions apply to the model
with local currency when the dollar debt is in the crisis zone. The optimal solution
for new dollar debt, given its current level, is obtained in numerical form as shown
in Figure 10.
3.6 Welfare for the national government
The main objective of our work is to describe the expected welfare of the government
of country i belonging to a monetary union and subject to a possible crisis of its
dollar debt. We compare this result with the expected welfare given by the original
Cole-Kehoe model and also to a model with local currency. In assessing the welfare
of a country in a monetary union, we consider the possibility of a union central bank
33subject to political inﬂuences and also the presence of imperfect correlation between
the national and central government types.
3.6.1 Welfare when union central bank is free of political inﬂuences
• Dollar debt in the no-crisis zone and possibility of inﬂation
For dollar debt levels in the no-crisis zone, external creditors know that the
national government always prefers to pay back its debts, no matter what the real-
ization of the sunspot variables ζ





i, ηi, ηu), with Bi ≤ b(kni, Di, ξ




=1 , the expected welfare for country i before realization of the sunspots depends
on the assumption we make regarding the symmetry of shocks between the types of
national and central governments. The speciﬁcation of this welfare also depends on
the optimal choices of the government for new dollar debt. As seen in the previous
section, there is no conﬁrmation that stationary dollar debt is the optimal choice
when there is a positive probability that the central government will inﬂate the com-
mon currency. Nevertheless, we suppose that the government follows a stationary
dollar debt policy and we describe the welfare thus provided, in accordance with the
beliefs of the private sector regarding the correlation of shocks between the national
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8Stationary debt policy means that the government dollar debt stays constant at the initial
level. We do not maintain the assumption of stationarity in the numerical exercisies. We procced
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u) and unndpB (kni,ξ
u) are the instantaneous utility when
the central government decides, respectively, not to partial default and to
partial default the common-currency debt, and the national government does
not default on the dollar debt.
(ii) imperfect correlation, with ηi and ηu symmetric at the initial period
Now welfare depends on the joint probabilities of ηi and ηu,s p e c i ﬁed in Table



























(iii) imperfect correlation, with ηi and ηu symmetric at all times
Supposing the expectation is that at every moment the realization of the sunspot
variables indicate that the national and the central government are of the same type,






















In the case of asymmetric shocks, the expected welfare is analogous, except that
the probabilities of the events sc and si are substituted by ac and ai.
• Dollar debt in the crisis zone
35When dollar debt is in the crisis zone of probability πi (1 − ξ
u),r e a l i z a t i o no f
the sunspot variable ζ
i,a l o n gw i t hηi and ηu, has bearing. The joint probabilities
of shocks on the types of government and on the conﬁdence of external lenders are
s h o w ni nT a b l e5 .G i v e ni n i t i a ls t a t esi = (kπiξu




i, ηi, ηu), with
Bi > b(kni, Di, ξ
u), Di ﬁxed, ai
−1 =1and ϑ
u
−1 =1 , the expected welfare for country
i, according to the correlation of shocks regarding the type of national and central






























































(si, Bi, q∗i, Di, qi), uπi(kπiξu
,πi,φ





u)a n dV di(kdi, ·, Di, αi, 1, ·, ·, ηu) are speciﬁed in Appendix B,
respectively, by the expressions (30), (23), (24), (31) and (22).
(ii) imperfect correlation, with ηi and ηu possibly symmetric at the initial period
The expected welfare depends on the joint probabilities of the sunspot variables,




















































(iii) imperfect correlation, with ηi and ηu symmetric at all times

























































I nt h ec a s eo fa s y m m e t r i cs h o c k s ,w er e p l a c ensc, nsi, dsi and dsc with nac, nai,
dai and dac, respectively.
3.6.2 Welfare when union central bank is subject to political pressures
In the model with local currency, the government can exert political pressure on its
central bank in order to obtain additional budgetary resources. This possibility is
not considered by the private sector in its optimization problem. Hence, national
consumers and international bankers are surprised by a decision of the central bank
to reduce the real value of its local-currency debt without an external crisis. Nev-
ertheless, for a given initial aggregate state and before realization of the sunspot
variables, the private sector attributes a parameter ψ
i to describe its beliefs regard-
ing the independence of the central bank, with ψ
i varying in the interval [0, 1/ξ
i].
If ψ
i =0 , the central bank is free of political pressures (strong), and at the other
extreme, if ψ
i =1 /ξ
i, the central bank is highly subject to political interference
(weak).
In the monetary union model we also allow a situation like the one described
above, in which the central government can inﬂate the common currency even if
the majority of votes are not from countries facing external debt crises. Instead,
this decision results from pressure by some national governments for the purpose of
raising extra revenue through an inﬂation tax. In particular, suppose that all the
union’s countries have dollar debt levels in their respective crisis zones of probability
πi(1 − ξ
u). Suppose further that more than two-thirds of the votes come from
countries whose sunspot variable realization corresponds to ζ
i >π i. If the union
37central bank is strong, its optimal choice is ϑ
u =1 . If it decides on ϑ
u = φ
u,t h e n
it is beholden to the interests of member countries that want inﬂation despite the
absence of any external crisis.
T h ep r i v a t es e c t o ra n dt h en a t i o n a lg o v e r n m e n to fe a c hc o u n t r ya r en o ta w a r e
of when the central bank will act in this manner, but attribute a parameter ψ
u,
analogous to ψ
i,v a r y i n gi nt h ei n t e r v a l[ 0, 1/ξ
u]. If they believe the central bank
is independent of pressures by national governments, then ψ




The member countries will be aﬀected by an arbitrary decision of a weak central
bank, whose eﬀect on their welfare depends on the initial state of their economies.
In the monetary union model, surprise inﬂation can occur even if country i is under
a speculative attack, unlike in the local currency model, in which a weak central
bank only inﬂates the local currency when the country is not in a crisis. Therefore,
we consider the following cases:
Dollar debt in the no-crisis zone
Given the initial state si = (kni, Bi, Di, ai
−1, ϑ
u
−1, ·, ηi, ηu), with ai




i and ηu >ξ
u. In accordance with the realization of the sunspot variables,
domestic creditors do not believe that the government will abate its debt in common
currency and thus pay β(1 − ξ
u + ξ
uφ
u) for this debt at the start. However, the
central government decides on ϑ
u = φ
u, surprising consumers. Taking into account
av a l u eo f i not equal to 1, the utility of a member country i at the moment of
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After a decision to inﬂate the common currency and given that there has been no
dollar-debt moratorium, the state of the economy is si = (kni, Bi, Di, 1, φ
u, ·, ·, ·)









u) is given by expression (12). Therefore, given initial state si =
(kni, Bi, Di, 1, 1, ·, ηi, ηu) and a weak union central bank, the expected welfare for
country i, according to the correlation of shocks regarding the type of national and


































































































u)a n dV niξu
(si) correspond to expression (12),
(13) and (11).














































where Vs y sc (si) corresponds to expression (14).
39If there are asymmetric shocks, we replace sc and si with ac and ai.
Dollar debt in the crisis zone
1. Initial state si = (kπiξu




i, ηi, ηu), with ai




i ≤ πi and ηu >ξ
u
Given the realization of the sunspot variables, international bankers pay zero
for the dollar bonds of country i and consumers pay β(1 − ξ
u + ξ
uφ
u)f o rc o m -
mon currency debt. However, after these choices, the union central bank decides
to inﬂate the common currency (ϑ
u = φ
u). Each government receives revenue of
 i (1 − φ
u)Di and since external creditors refuse to extend new loans, each govern-
ment has two choices: (i) to use the inﬂation tax to repay international bankers and
avoid a default on the dollar debt; and (ii) not to do so. The optimal choice is that
providing the greatest welfare.
In the ﬁrst case, consumers choose capital kt+1 = kni, because international
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The aggregate state in the next period is si = (kni, 0, Di, 1, φ
u, ·, ·, ·), with Bi =
0, ai
−1 =1 , ϑ
u
−1 = φ
u and any ζ
i, ηi and ηu. The optimal choice of the government
is to follow a stationary debt policy, with Bi0 = Bi =0and consumers pay βφ
u for










u) is given by expression (18) in Appendix A.
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The initial state in the next period is si = (kdi, 0, Di, αi, φ
u, ·, ·, ·), with Bi =0 ,
ai
−1 = αi, ϑ
u
−1 = φ
u and any ζ









u) is given by expression (21) in Appendix A.
2. Initial state si = (kπiξu




i, ηi, ηu), with ai




i >π i and ηu >ξ
u:
The realizations of ζ
i and ηu induce international bankers to pay β(1 − πi +
πiξ




u). After these decisions, however, the union central bank declares
a partial moratorium on debt in the hands of domestic creditors, leading them to
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T h ei n i t i a ls t a t ei nt h en e x tp e r i o di ssi = (kπi, Bi, Di, 1, φ
u, ζ
i, ·, ·)a n dt h ee x p e c t e d
welfare based thereon is given by V πi(kπi, Bi, Di, 1, φ
u, ζ
i, ·, ·), in accordance with
expression (24).
41Finally, we describe the expected welfare of country i when the union central
bank is weak and the dollar debt is in the crisis zone. We suppose that if ζ
i ≤ πi
in the initial state, the national government prefers to repay its external debt upon
receiving its share of inﬂation tax. Hence, given initial state si = (kπiξu





i, ηi, ηu), with ai
−1 =1 , ϑ
u
−1 =1 , before realization of the sunspot variables
and revelation of the type of union central bank, the expected welfare of the country




















































































































































































































42(iii) imperfectly correlated, with ηi and ηu possibly symmetric at all times
The expected welfare is the same as (17), except that V πiξu
(si) is changed to
Vs y nsc (si),w h i c hi sg i v e nb y( 1 6 ) .
I nt h ec a s eo fa s y m m e t r i cs h oc k s ,w er e p l a c ensc, nsi, dsi and dsc by, respectively,
nac, nai, dai,a n ddac.
4 A Numerical Exercise
Using the extension of the Cole-Kehoe model for monetary union, we carry out
simulations for the recent Brazilian economy, as if Brazil were a member of such a
union. Besides this, we compare these results with those of a simulation using the
original Cole-Kehoe model (dollarization) and one based on purely local currency.
The parameters used in the simulations are supported by suppositions very similar
t ot h o s eo fC o l ea n dK e h o e[ 4 ] .
4.1 The parameters for the Brazilian economy
We have chosen the parameters so that the initial period reproduces the situation
of the Brazilian economy between June 1999 and May 2001. This two-year interval
equals the average maturity period of Brazilian government debt. We assume that
the average maturity of local-currency debt follows the average for debt indexed by
t h eS E L I Cr a t e( t h eb a s i cr a t es e tb yt h eB r a z i l i a nC e n t r a lB a n k ) ,w h i l et h a tf o r
dollar debt is the same as for dollar-indexed bonds. Both average maturities are
approximately 24 months for the period under study.
We designate values equal to those used by Cole and Kehoe for Mexico for the
production function and the coeﬃcient of relative risk-aversion, risk. The produc-
tion function is speciﬁed by f (k)=Akν,w i t hν being the capital share, equal to
0.5. The risk parameter corresponds to 1, implying a logarithmic function for the
utility of current government consumption. Additionally, Cole and Kehoe supposed
that if the government did not pay its debt, Mexican production would fall to 95%
of its former level for the post-crisis period. Hence, the coeﬃcient α equals 0.95. We
43use the same hypothesis for Brazil. The tax rate on net income, θ, corresponds to
the total tax burden as a percentage of GDP. We set this parameter at 0.30 for the
two-year period, very near oﬃcial ﬁgures of 29.33% for 1998 and 31.67% for 1999.
According to Cole and Kehoe, the probability of default on the dollar debt, π,i s
based on the yearly yield on short-term, dollar-indexed, Mexican government bonds













where r is the yearly average yield of the government dollar-denominated or dollar-
indexed bonds of the country that can suspend its payments; r∗, is the yearly average
yield of U.S. Treasury bonds; and n, the number of periods in the simulation making
up a year. For Brazil, r is the net yield of Brazilian federal government bonds, with
values updated (monetarily restated) by the dollar and maturing in two years, sold
at public auctions by the Brazilian Central Bank. Using these data for Brazilian
and U.S. government bonds with similar characteristics, we estimate π at between
4% and 8% during the year 2000 and the ﬁrst half of 2001.
Employing the same procedure adopted by Cole and Kehoe, we calculate the
discount factor, β, as the yield to maturity of Treasury bonds with two-year matu-
rities, deﬂated by the inﬂation expectation as published in The Economist for the
U.S. Consumer Price Index. Based on these ﬁgures, we obtain four estimates for β
during the period under analysis, varying between 0.93 and 0.96. The depreciation
factor, δ, depends on the value given to β, under the condition that the capital-
output ratio is 3.0. Total factor productivity, A, is considered a scale parameter in
the simulation, as is the weight of the utility of private consumption relative to the
utility of government consumption, represented by  .
In order to estimate welfare, we specify the government debt in local (or common)
currency. Public-sector debt in local (or common) currency, D,r e l a t i v et oG D Pw a s
30% during the months of June 1999 to May 2001. Also, as reference, the government
dollar debt, B, for the same period, is equal to 0.20 relative to GDP and corresponds
44to the public-sector debt held by foreign lenders (less international reserves) plus
dollar-indexed debt.
The simulation requires three other parameters. The ﬁr s ti st h es h a r eo fr e a l
return of debt denominated in common currency eﬀectively paid, ϑ
u, which is deﬁned
as the inverse of the inﬂation factor. We use the oﬃcial inﬂation measured for the




u and its parameterization can be better explained in the following
manner. Suppose, as is the case for the numerical exercise, that total public debt
equals 50% of GDP, with 20% corresponding to dollar-based debt and the rest to the
(local or common) currency debt. If international bankers are unwilling to extend
further loans, then to avoid a default on the dollar debt, the national government
carries out a ﬁscal adjustment amounting to approximately 5% of GDP, and the
central government decides to pay only a fraction, ϑ
u of the common-currency debt.
For the national government to have 15% of GDP to help pay its external debt,
what should the factor ϑ
u be?
If the central government pays half of the real value of the common-currency
debt (ϑ
u =0 .5), then this analogous to 100% inﬂation. In particular, suppose that
initially the nominal price of each common-currency bond is β · $1 and the price of
one unit of the good is $1. The expense incurred by a national creditor is 10·β·$1 to
acquire 10 common-currency bonds. In the following period, this investment yields
the creditor $10, and if there were no inﬂation, each consumer could then purchase
10 units of the reference good. However, with inﬂation of 100%, the nominal result
of the investment remains $10, but the creditor can acquire only ﬁve rather than
ten units of this good. The central government thus retains the other ﬁve units,
using them to pay oﬀ its foreign debt. Hence, revenue from inﬂation, in units of
the good, corresponds to (1 − pt−1/pt) · D.G i v e nϑ
u =0 .88, this expression equals
(1−0.88)·0.30, meaning an inﬂation tax equivalent to 3.6% of GDP in the period.
To obtain receipts equal to 15% of GDP, then, the reduction in common-currency
45debt should be 50% (ϑ
u =0 .5), corresponding to inﬂation of 100%.
To proceed with the numerical exercise, the other three parameters needed are
ξ, ψ and  . In the case of a weak central bank, ψ chosen is that of the extreme
case, 1/ξ.I nt h es i m u l a t i o n s ,ξ and   take on arbitrary values.
4.2 Preliminary results
Experimenting with these parameters allowed us to select a set of them to use in
the simulations of the three models. In particular, we chose the joint probabilities
in such a way that in the monetary union model there is strong symmetry among
the national and central government types. For such symmetry, we use dai, dac,
nai and nac very near zero. Besides this, we assume ξ
i and ξ
u are identical, with
both denoted by ξ alone in the simulations, and we suppose that the welfare for
imperfect correlation between ηi and ηu is characterized by the expression for pos-
sible symmetry at the initial period. Given π and ξ, we arbitrarily calculate the
probabilities of ζ
i, ηi and ηu occurring, subject only to the values of the marginal
densities. The levels of welfare are estimated, supposing diﬀerent values for ξ in
the set {0.1; 0.2; ... ; 0.9}. At the same time, we parameterize the inﬂuence of the
member country on a weak union’s central bank, with   both zero and 10. Making
  equal to 10 means that the national government of a monetary union collects
ten times the revenue extracted through the inﬂation tax when the central bank
imposes surprise inﬂation. This is doubtless a strong hypothesis, but it allows a
better depiction of the eﬀect on welfare.
According to the model, the higher ξ is, the greater the diﬀerence between the
levels of welfare for strong (independent) and weak (subject to political pressure)
central banks in the model with local currency. The expected welfare is greater the
higher the chance is of a strong central bank inﬂa t i n gt h el o c a lm o n e y ,b e c a u s et h e
prices of local currency bonds are lower, and if there is no speculative attack on
dollar debt, then the ﬁnancial gains of local consumers are greater. On the other
hand, given these lower prices for bonds in local currency, surprise inﬂation extracts
46a portion of domestic creditors’ gains and also makes it impossible to them realize
those high ﬁnancial gains in the future, since there is no longer the chance to inﬂate.
In the model with common currency, as ξ rises, so does the weighting on expected
welfare referring to the welfare with decision to inﬂate, for both weak and strong
union central banks. Therefore, the eﬀect of ξ is diﬀerent in the two models (local
and common currency) in respect to the expected welfare for distinct types of central
banks. These results are obtained by considering that   =1 .W h e n  is greater
than 1, the eﬀect of surprise inﬂation makes the expected welfare greater for a
member country with strong inﬂuence over the union’s central bank, and hence
there is a distancing between the expected welfare with a strong versus a weak
union central bank.
We carry out numerical exercises with diﬀerent values of the parameters   and
ξ and for the joint probabilities. The parameters for the baseline model and the
probabilities of the sunspot variables are shown in Tables 1 and 2, in Appendix B.
We modify the function v in relation to the Cole-Kehoe model. In the original
model, v is a logarithmic function of the type aln(g)+b,w i t ha and b equal to
1 and zero respectively. This change is necessary because the combination of the
parameters and   equal to 1 generates greater welfare when the central bank is
weak than when it is strong. This result arises from the chosen parameterization,
which is responsible for producing disutility of public consumption for consumers
when the level of public consumption is low. With surprise inﬂation and   =1 ,p r i -
vate consumption is subtracted from the inﬂation tax that brings one-time revenues
for the government. At the same time, the lower disutility, caused by increased
public spending, more than oﬀsets the eﬀect of the drop in private consumption at
the instant the weak central bank carries out surprise inﬂation. This eﬀect is so
i n t e n s et h a ti to ﬀsets the loss of the alternative of inﬂating the common currency
in subsequent periods. This result is undesirable. Therefore, we parameterize a
and b, respectively, at 1/10 and 1. Besides this, to reduce the weight of private
consumption, c, in consumer utility it is necessary to reduce  .
47The ﬁrst exercise refers to a simulation with ξ equal to 0.9 and   zero. In
this case, there is a 90% chance that the government will not pay 12% of the real
return on its bonds in local or common currency. Only 0.88 of the unit value of
the good will be redeemed at maturity, not the full value as would be the case in
dollar-denominated bonds. In a monetary union,   = 0 means that there are no
transfers to the national government of the tax so collected. In an economy with
local currency,   is assumed always to equal 1, because the national government
destines all the tax for its own use. We compare, for a given ξ, the situation with  
zero and also equal to 10 in order to characterize, respectively, a member country
w h o s ee n t i r ei n ﬂation tax revenue is destined to another country and a country that
receives transfers of 10 times the inﬂation tax.
In the ﬁgures we present the levels of welfare under uncertainty for the three
monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. For the local-
currency regime, we conduct variations regarding the type of central bank, strong or
weak. For monetary union, besides these variations, we conduct exercises regarding
the symmetry between shocks that determines the types of central and national
governments, which can be either perfectly correlated or symmetric. The results
show that the three levels of welfare are decreasing with the total amount of public
debt. Welfare with common currency (de n o t e db yC O M )a n dw i t hl o c a lc u r r e n c y
(LOCAL) vary only for values of total debt relative to GDP above 0.30, because
both models include debt in the money of the country or of the union, which are
ﬁxed at this level.
In Figure 2, the greatest welfare corresponds to the local currency regime with
a strong central bank (LOCAL,STR), depicted in the graphs by dashed lines. In
comparing Graphs I and II, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between welfare levels
for monetary union with a strong central bank (COM,STR) and poor central bank
(COM,WEA), since the probability ξ is high. Furthermore, Graph I shows that for
debt relative to GDP greater than 30%, the country prefers monetary union over
dollarization, given the hypothesis of symmetry with ξ equal to 0.9, denoted by sy1.
48In the case of perfectly correlated shocks, welfare referring to common currency,
weak central bank and perfect correlation (COM,WEA,P.CO) is much nearer that
with local currency (LOCAL,STR) than the welfare referring to symmetric shocks
(COM,WEA,SYM), as can be seen by comparing the distances between the solid and
dashed lines in Graphs II and III. Hence, more symmetric shocks bring monetary
union closer to an independent monetary regime. We make a ﬁnal observation in
t h ec a s eo fξ =0 .9 and   =0 , shown in Graphs III and IV, respectively, of Figure
2, ﬁnding that the behavior of the welfare curve for an economy with local currency
and weak central bank slopes downward relative to that for a strong central bank.
Carrying out the simulation with ξ =0 .9 and   =1 0 , we obtain the four graphs
s h o w ni nF i g u r e3 ,w h i c ha r ev e r ys i m i l a rt ot h o s eo fF i g u r e2 .T h ec h a n g ei nt h e
parameter   from zero to 10 causes little variation in the levels of welfare. However,
one can see that the welfare with common currency and perfectly correlated shocks
(COM,WEA,P.CO) is slightly greater than that with local currency (LOCAL,WEA)
when the central banks are subject to political pressures. This result can be seen
in Graph IV of Figure 3. The diﬀerence between the two levels of welfare is never
greater than 0.13% of the welfare with local currency. Under a regime of monetary
union with a weak central bank and   =1 0 , consumers suﬀer from surprise inﬂa-
tion and the government receives 10 times this value in exchange, while with local
currency the extra government reven u ei se q u a lt ot h et r a n s f e r .T h i se ﬀect is even
more evident when the exercise is conducted with ξ =0 .1, as shown below.
By altering ξ to 0.1, the expected welfare with dollarization remains unchanged.
However, with low ξ the expected welfare with local currency for strong (LO-
CAL,STR) and weak (LOCAL,WEA) central banks is very near. This eﬀect can be
seen by comparing the dashed-line curves in Graphs III and IV of Figure 4, which
are practically the same relative to the solid-line curves. Furthermore, with ξ =
0.1, one can see in more accentuated form the fall in welfare of a government under
the three monetary regimes, for dollar-denominated debt levels in the crisis zone.
T h e r ei sas l i g h tb u ts u d d e nd r o pi nt h ew e l f a r ea tt h et o t a ld e b tm a r kb e y o n dw h i c h
49there is uncertainty regarding repayment of dollar debt. This mark refers to a dollar
debt/GDP ratio of 0.4 or to total debt/GDP of 0.7. The case of ξ =0 .1,a l s os h o w s
that greater symmetry of shocks also raises the welfare of the economy nearer that
of the economy with local currency and a strong central bank.
When we suppose that   =1 0 , the welfare under a regime with common cur-
rency and symmetry of shocks moves upward. This movement can be observed by
comparing the two solid-line curves in Graphs II of Figures 4 and 5. In the same
fashion, one can see by comparing Graphs III of these two ﬁgures that the change
in   from 0 to 10 causes an upward shift in the expected welfare of a govern-
ment with common currency and perfectly correlated shocks (COM,WEA,P.CO),
which surpasses the expected welfare with local currency and strong central bank
(LOCAL,STR). This behavior of the graphs results exclusively from the surprise
inﬂation and its eﬀect on the instantaneous utility of individuals at the initial mo-
ment.
In the exercises that follow, we modify the values given to the joint probabilities
to characterize the shocks on the central and national types of government with
less symmetry than that speciﬁed previously above. The new values for the joint
probabilities of the sunspot variables are depicted in Table 3 and they are denoted
as sy2.
In the next four ﬁgures (6-9), besides making the shocks slightly less symmetric
and   equal to 10, we calculate the expected welfare levels for ﬁve diﬀerent values
of ξ. With this new speciﬁcation for symmetry of shocks, the welfare with common
currency and strong central bank is below that for a dollarized regime for any level of
total public debt that external creditors are willing to acquire under these regimes,
a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e6 .T h i sr e s u l th o l d sf o rd i ﬀerent values of ξ.M o r e o v e r ,w e l f a r e
of a government belonging to a monetary union with a strong central bank varies
very little with ξ. In this grouping of curves, the uppermost one refers to ξ =0 .9,
while the lowest one corresponds to ξ =0 .1.
A country with local currency and strong central bank shows greater expected
50welfare than does one with dollarization, as can be seen in Figure 7. There is more
signiﬁcant variation in the expected welfare with local currency for diﬀe r e n tv a l u e so f
ξ than with common currency. The highest curve refers to ξ =0 .9.A sξ gets higher,
the curve drops oﬀ less drastically. The high probability of the government resorting
to an inﬂation tax to meet foreign debt commitments reduces the uncertainty of a
debt crisis and hence the dropoﬀ is lower. Therefore, the lower the probability of
the national or central government to inﬂate, respectively, the local and common
currencies, the less attractive these regimes become in terms of expected welfare,
given that the respective central banks are strong (immune to political pressures).
Figures 8 and 9 show the results supposing the central bank is weak. In Figure
8, the expected welfare with common currency is not always lower than that for a
dollarized economy for all levels of debt under this regime. This result depends on ξ.
The curve for ξ =0 .1 is the uppermost one and, the lowest, corresponds to ξ =0 .9.
The lower ξ is, the higher the price consumers will pay for bonds in the common
currency, β[1 − ξ(1 − φ
u)], because the private sector sees little risk of devaluing
that currency. However, if the central bank surprises domestic creditors by inﬂating
the common currency, the losses for domestic creditors are greater when they believe
the risk of devaluation is low (low ξ). This loss for domestic bondholders translates
into gains for the government that are leveraged tenfold because   =1 0 .T h e r e f o r e ,
the welfare is greater for ξ =0 .1 than for ξ =0 .9, when the central bank is weak.
Figure 8 seeks to show the situations in which the economic parameters can indicate
that joining an economic union can be a better solution than dollarization and vice-
versa. On the other hand, this conclusion does not extend to the local currency
regime.
In Figure 9, even with a weak central bank, the expected welfare of a government
with local currency and independent monetary policy surpasses that for a dollarized
regime for diﬀerent values of ξ.T h ee ﬀect of ξ on expected welfare is very slight. One
m i g h te x p e c tt h a tw h e nt h ec e n t r a lb a n ki se a s i l yi n ﬂuenced by political pressures,
the expected welfare of a dollarized regime would be more attractive, but the result
51does not show this.
Finally, Figure 10 represents an extension of the Cole-Kehoe exercise to describe
the optimal path of dollar debt for a country wishing to leave the crisis zone. At
each instant, given a level of current debt in dollars (on the horizontal axis), the
curves determine the optimal choice for new dollar debt (on the vertical axis). Each
of the graphs in this ﬁgure represents one of the monetary regimes under analysis.
Dollarization produces a result analogous to that of Cole-Kehoe, only with para-
meters for the Brazilian economy. In the ﬁrst and second graphs, corresponding
respectively to local currency and dollarization, the optimal government choice is to
maintain debt at a constant level for all current dollar debt up to the lower limit
of the crisis zone. This lower bound, b(kn, D), for the model with local currency
equals 0.38 relative to GDP, and for dollarization, b(kn) is 0.40. In this fashion, in
an interval of current dollar debt [0, b(kn,D)]o r[ 0, b(kn)], the government dollar
debt policy function coincides with a 45-degree line in the two monetary regimes.
In the lower graph, referring to monetary union, this coincidence does not occur.
Under this regime, the lower bound of the crisis zone, b(kn, D, ξ), corresponds to
0.35 relative to GDP, given ξ =0 .9. The greater the probability that the central
government will inﬂate the common currency, the higher and further away is the
optimal-choice curve from the 45-degrees line. Consequently, the optimal choice is
n o tt om a i n t a i nt h ed o l l a rd e b ta tt h es a m el e v e la st h ec u r r e n to n ei nt h en o - c r i s i s
zone, but instead to choose a higher value. In a monetary union the chance for the
central government to inﬂate the common money encourages incurring dollar debt
in countries without credit risk.
For current dollar debt in the crisis zone, the government policy function consists
of a lower debt level than the initial one. This can be seen under the three monetary
regimes. Furthermore, under the local currency regime, the greater the probability
of the government’s creating inﬂation tax, the higher the level of dollar debt that
external lenders are willing to bear. This result is due to the lower probability of an
external debt crisis insofar as the government is more willing to use resources from
52abating real return on debt in local currency to honor its international payments.
The probability of an external debt crisis is π(1 − ξ) in the model with local currency,
and thus is less for ξ equal to 0.9 than 0.1. As the probability of a debt crisis falls, the
government policy function approaches the 45-degree line, indicating less uncertainty
concerning payment of dollar debt.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper brings into discussion one aspect of the debate about the monetary
regimes of dollarization, monetary union and local currency with independent mon-
etary policy. In particular, it develops a framework more suited for economies that
are heavily dependent on international lending, like the Latin-American and emerg-
ing market economies from Southeast Asia, in their evaluation about the diﬀerent
options of monetary regimes. We have donet h i sw i t ham a c r o e c o n o m i cm o d e lt h a t
incorporates microfundamentals, rational expectations and dynamic optimization,
using as a reference the model developed by Cole and Kehoe.
Cole-Kehoe’s procedure to obtain the welfare for an economy subject to specu-
lative attacks on its external debt has served as the starting point to describe an
economy under the local currency regime and monetary union. The main ingredients
o ft h e s en e wv e r s i o n sa r et h ei n c o r p o r a t i o no fd e b ti nl o c a la n dc o m m o nc u r r e n c y ,
thus allowing a national government or the central government of a monetary union,
respectively, to resort to lowering the real return on this debt (owned by domestic
consumers), using the revenue so extracted to avoid an external debt crisis whose
consequences could be even worse in terms of welfare. Besides these modiﬁcations,
we also have included a parameter that seeks to distinguish strong and weak central
banks for both these regimes. We went a bit further by describing the symmetry
of shocks between the national and central types of governments for the monetary
union model.
The numerical exercise for Brazil consisted of a test of the proposed models
and is not intended to provide a deﬁnitive answer to the decision a country should
53take as to its monetary regime. Nevertheless, the model contributes to a better
understanding of some questions involved in the issue of whether or not a country
should keep its own currency, given that it is heavily dependent on foreign capital.
The preliminary results indicate, for example, that the regime of independent
monetary policy with local currency and a strong central bank dominates, in terms
of expected welfare, all the other models except that in which a country exercises
strong bargaining power over the central bank of a monetary union and is able to
obtain a greater portion of the inﬂation tax revenue than that extracted from its own
consumers. In the absence of such exceptional bargaining power, the simulations
reveal that the expected welfare with common currency more closely approaches a
situation with local currency as the symmetry increases between the types of national
and central governments in their respective decisions regarding debt devaluation.
Other results show that for strong national and union central banks (i.e., that only
resort to an inﬂation tax in case of an external crisis), the expected welfare rises as
the probability increases that the government will take this alternative to avoid an
external debt crisis. This happens because of the reduced uncertainty of a default
on the dollar debt. On the other hand, in the case of weak central banks, the less
the belief by the private sector that the government will devalue the currency, the
greater the expected welfare. Finally, the simulations also indicate that for a given
initial debt in dollars in the crisis zone, international bankers extend larger loans to
economies with local currency and strong central banks the greater the willingness
to inﬂa t et h em o n e yt oa v o i dad e f a u l t .T h i se ﬀect is not so evident with a common
currency. In this case, what calls attention is the greater incentive governments of
the member countries have to increase their new dollar debts, for a given current
dollar debt in the no-crisis zone, as stronger the beliefs of the private sector get that
the central government is willing to devalue the common currency
The framework we develop in this paper, which constitutes of the original Cole-
Kehoe model and the two extensions, should be placed among other models of
modern macroeconomics that discuss the issue of whether or not a country should
54keep its own currency. In this group includes the works of Cooley and Quadrini
[7], Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21] and Mendoza [16]. They mainly focus on the
debate over dollarization and use an approach very similar to the one developed
in our paper, which is made up of two parts: a theoretical model and numerical
simulations. Future extensions of our work will be aimed at carrying out simulations
in which debt in local or common currency is not ﬁxed but instead results from an
optimization exercise as is the case for dollar debt. Besides this, from a theoretical
standpoint, the welfare under a local currency regime needs to be reﬁned so as
to react more strongly to changes in the type of central bank. It would be more
representative if dollarization indeed posed more eﬀective competition to the local
currency regime with a weak central bank.
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58A Welfare Levels to Construct the Crisis Zone
The description of the levels of welfare to construct the crisis zone of probability
πi(1 − ξ
u) is carried out supposing that the indebtedness in common currency, Di,
is ﬁxed and that the abatement factor for this debt, φ
u,i sak n o w nf r a c t i o n .




i, ηi, ηu), with Bi ≤ b(kni, Di,
ξ
u), ai
−1 =1 , ϑ
u
−1 =1 ,a n yζ
i and ηi and ηu >ξ
u, the levels of welfare on the left
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where, yndi = αif (kni) − δ
ikni and V di(kdi, 0, Di, αi, 1, ·, ·, ηu) is the expected
welfare after a default on the dollar debt and probability ξ
u of a partial default on
the common-currency debt.
Since V niξu
(si, 0, 0, Di, β (1 − ξ
u + φξ
u)) is a decreasing function of Bi and
V diξu
(si, 0, 0, Di, β (1 − ξ
u + φξ
u)) does not change with this variable, then the
highest dollar debt level, b(kni,D i,ξ
u), is obtained when condition (7)i ss a t i s ﬁed
with equality. Moreover, for ξ
u =0 ,w eh a v ebi (kni,D i,0) = bi (kni,D i).
To characterize the conditions for the upper limit of the crisis zone, ﬁrst we
specify the left side of condition (9). Given the initial state si = (kπiξu





i, ηi, ηu), with Bi stationary and inside the crisis zone of probability πi(1 −
ξ
u), ai
−1 =1 , ϑ
u
−1 =1 , ζ
i ≤ πi, ηu ≤ ξ



















































































































































































































































u) is the instantaneous utility when the central government
decides to make a partial default on the common-currency debt; V πi(kπi, Bi, Di, 1,
φ
u, ζ
i, ·, ·) is the expected welfare, given initial aggregate state si = (kπi, Bi, Di,
1, φ
u, ζ
i, ·, ·), after a partial default on the common-currency debt and probability
π of a dollar debt crisis occurring next period; uπi(kπi, φ
u, πi), udi(kπi, φ
u)a n d
udi(kdi, φ
u) are the instantaneous utilities when the national government decides,
respectively, not to default, to default given Ki = kπi and to default given Ki = kdi.
The right side of condition (9), V di(si, Bi, q∗i(Bi), Di, βφ
u), is obtained by
supposing that the government of country i has chosen zi =0and the central
government ϑ
u = φ
u. As seen in the previous paragraph, given the realizations of
ζ
i and ηu, lenders acquire dollar debt at a positive price β(1 − πi)a n dc o m m o n -
currency debt at βφ
u. Even though the external creditors renew their loans, the






















































































is the instantaneous utility when the national government de-



















such that at time t+1,t h es t a t ei ssi = (kdi, Bi, Di, αi, 1, ·, ηu), characterized by a
moratorium in dollar debt in the previous period, and udi ¡
kdi,φ
u¢
is deﬁned as per
expression (26).
In a similar procedure, we characterize condition (8). For an initial state si =
(kπiξu
, Bi, Di, 1, 1, ζ
i, ηi, ηu), with Bi stationary and in the crisis zone of probability
πi(1 − ξ
u), ζ
i >π i and ηu >ξ
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u), V πi(kπi, Bi, Di, 1, φ
u, ζ
i, ·, ·)a n dV di(kdi, 0, Di, αi, 1,












are the instantaneous utilities when the gov-
ernment decides, respectively, not to default and to default on the dollar debt, given
initial aggregate state si = (kπiξu
, Bi, Di, 1, 1, ζ
i, ηi, ηu), with ζ
i >π i and ηu >ξ
u
in the ﬁrst case and ζ
i ≤ πiand ηu >ξ
u, in the later one. In both cases, the central
government does not partial default on the common-currency debt.
The right side of condition (8), V di(si, Bi, q∗i, Di, qi), is obtained when we
suppose that the national government chooses zi =0and the central government
ϑ
u =1 . Given the realization of the sunspot variables, lenders buy dollar bonds at a
positive price, q∗i, and bonds in common currency at qi. Assuming a stationary debt
level and positive probability that the central government will inﬂate the common
currency, then the welfare for the government of country i, on deciding to undertake































































where, V di(kdi, Bi, Di, αi, 1, ·, ηu) is given by the expression (22), with z =0 .
63BT a b l e s a n d F i g u r e s
β risk   α ν A δ π θ ϑ
0.93 1 0.7 0.95 0.5 0.8 0.20 0.04 0.3 0.88
Table 1: Simulation Parameters
ξ =0 .1
dsi dai dsc dac nsi nai nsc nac
0.004 0.000 0.035 0.001 0.095 0.001 0.86 0.004
ξ =0 .9
dsi dai dsc dac nsi nai nsc nac
0.035 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.86 0.004 0.095 0.001
Table 2: Parameterization of the Joint Probabilities (sy1)
ξ =0 .1
dsi dai dsc dac nsi nai nsc nac
0.004 0.000 0.034 0.002 0.094 0.002 0.855 0.009
ξ =0 .9
dsi dai dsc dac nsi nai nsc nac
0.034 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.855 0.009 0.094 0.002
Table 3: Parameterization of the Joint Probabilities (sy2)
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Table 4: Joint Probability for the Shocks about Government Types
ζ
i >π i e ζ
i >π i e ζ
i ≤ πi e ζ
i ≤ πi e
ηu >ξ
u ηu ≤ ξ






i nsc nai − −
ζ
i >π i
e ηi ≤ ξ
i nac nsi − −
ζ
i ≤ πi
e ηi ≤ ξ




i − − dai dsc
Table 5: Joint Probability for the Three Sunspot Variables
 A
B = { H,H,H }
C = { H,T,H }
D = { H,H,T }
E = { H,T,T }
F = { T,H,H }
G = { T,T,H }
H = { T,H,T }









Figure 1: Tree Diagram
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Figure 2: Welfare under Diﬀerent Monetary Regimes (ξ =0 .9;  =0 )
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Figure 3: Welfare for Diﬀerent Monetary Regimes (ξ =0 .9;  =1 0 )
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Figure 4: Welfare for Diﬀerent Monetary Regimes (ξ =0 .1;  =0 )
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Figure 5: Welfare for Diﬀerent Monetary Regimes (ξ =0 .1;  =1 0 )
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Figure 7: Welfare for Local Currency Regime with Strong Central Bank for
Various ξ
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Figure 8: Welfare for a Monetary Union with Weak Central Bank and Various ξ
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Various ξ























































































Figure 10: Government Dollar Debt Policy Function
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